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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF

THE STATE OF UTAH

·rHE s·rA'"fE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent
No. 10073

v.

ROBERT DELANEY,
Defendant-.~.4ppellant

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

ST~~ TE~IENT

OF THE KIND OF CASE

This is an indictable misdemeanor, automobile negligent homicide case brought under U tab Code Anno.
1953, 41-6-43.10.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The jury returned a verdict of guilty. The trial Court
denied the defendant's motions for judgment notwithstanding the ,·erdict and for a ne\v trial.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The defendant seeks a reversal of the verdict of guilty
and a remand with instruction to enter a judgment of
not guilty notwithstanding the jury~s verdict, and in the
alternative, a remand with instruction for a new trial.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A one car accident about midnight, March 2, 1963,
in Cedar Canyon, about two miles \\rest of Cedar City,
Utah, claimed the life of one of four occupants of the
automobile. The defendant was charged with and tried
for automobile negligent homicide under Utah Code
Anno. 1953, 41-6-43.10.
At the trial, Officer John R. Williams testified for
the State that he had been an investigating officer at
the scene of the accident. He described the location of
the car and the body (Tr. 6). He testified that he and
Officer William Burch made markings to identify skid
and other marks ( Tr. 11, line 2) . He spoke of finding
beer cans at the scene ( T r. 11, line 8) and said that one
of the occupants of the car, not the driver, had stated
to him that he guessed they had been racing a little
(Tr. 6, line 20). He testified that he had previously said
that he believed the defendant had not been drinking,
and he testified, that there 'vas no indication that the
defendant had been drinking (Tr. 14, line 2, 9).
Officer William Burch also generally described the
accident scene ( Tr. 23, line 28) . He testified that he
and others made markings to sho\v the course of travel
of the automobile (Tr. 27, line 16). He testified that he
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made no measurement that night (Tr. 29, line 3) but
that he and Sergeant Robert Reid and Trooper Elroy
~[ason returned in the morning and made measurements
(Tr. 29, line 15). He testified in detail and illustrated his
testimony by use of a blackboard (Tr. 30 and following).
Officer Burch testified concerning a skid test conducted by him (Tr. 53, line 30) and concerning the
grade of the road and the "super elevation" (bank of
the curve) of the road (Tr. 55, line 14; Tr. 56, line 1,
18).
He testified that he made so-called "chord mark" and
"middle ordinate" measurements of a scuff mark at the
scene (Tr. 66, line 1). He then testified that from these
measurements of the scuff mark he calculated the radius
of the curve of the scuff mark to be 707 feet (Tr. 67,
line 2).

Officer Burch admitted on cross examination that at
the time of the preliminary hearing he testified that "I
don,t know that we even measured it," (Tr. 101, line 22)
\rith reference to essential details about the measurements
and their location. He did not have his notes about the
measurements at the preliminary hearing nor did he ever
subsequently find them (Tr. 140, line 1-7).
On redirect examination he testified that some time
subsequent to the preliminary hearing "Sergeant Reid
and Trooper Mason and I determined together that that
,,·as "·here "·e measured. It was just opposite the 50 foot
mark" with reference to the chord mark and the middle
ordinate measurements (Tr. 128, line 6) and "We remembered where \\~e measured it" (Tr. 139, line 20).
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The defendant's motion to strike the testimony concerning these measurements was denied by the Court, the
Court commenting that he did not think the officer was
fabricating, that that question was for the jury~ but the
evidence would be retained on the recollection refreshed
theory (Tr. 140, line 24).
Mr. Ed M. Pitcher of the Utah State Highway Patrol
was called as an expert witness. He was asked hypothetical questions based upon the factual assumptions in
Officer Burch's testimony including the radius of the
scuff mark, the results of the skid test, the grade of the
road, the super elevation of the road and other factors
(Tr. 247~ line 11). He testified that under the facts
assumed in the hypothetical question a car would have
been traveling from 99.9 to 101 miles per hour (Tr. 252,
line 17, 28) . He testified that a difference in the facts
would make a difference in the result. Such differences
might concern the material of the road (Tr. 255, line 24),
foreign substances on the road (Tr. 255, line 29), moisture conditions (Tr. 256, line 7), the chord mark measurement and its location (Tr. 259~ line 27).
The defendant testified that he had had four beers
over a period of time earlier in the evening Tr. 473, line
24; Tr. 475, line 15). However there \\'"as no evidence
that he was or appeared to be intoxicated. Several \vitnesses~ including Officer Willian1s, Officer Burch, Dr.
Graff, Diana Lynn Miller, Melvin Douglas Clark, and
Kendall G. Cosslett testified that the defendant did not
appear to have been intoxicated (Tr. 14, line 2, 9; Tr. 85,
line 23 ~ Tr. 80, line 22; Tr. 368, line 17 ~ Tr. 435, line
12; and Tr. 465, line 17. 21).
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Mr. Higbee, another occupant of the car, testified
that he did have beer with him but that the defendant
had only one sip from an already opened can at the
start of the trip, but not tnore (Tr. 299, line 27).
A motion by the State that the jury be taken to vie\\'
the premises was granted but the view was not actually
takrn until near the end of the defendant's case in rebuttal. Prior to taking the view, the Court indicated
its intention to have Officer Burch or Trooper Mason
point out marks and other things and locations that had
been testified to (Tr. 445, line 4).
Although the defendant objected to this proposed
procedure (Tr. 446, line 20) , Officer Burch and the
Court did accompany the viewing party to the premises
{Tr. 447, line 11 ) . The Court itself took charge of the
view, commencing by describing the scene and commenting about "still visible" marks on the road, "paint or
crayon" on the road (Tr. 44 7, line 6) , pointing out
various things, making comments, and conducting a detailed, repetitive interrogation-discussion review with
Officer Burch of his prior testimony concerning the scene
and measurements (Tr. 44 7 through 460) .
The Court answered a juror's question (Tr. 451, line
20). Other jurors asked questions which were answered
by Officer Burch (Tr. 453, line 4, 12; Tr. 454·, line 14,
21, 27; Tr. 455, line 9, 15, 17, 19, 21) or by the Court
with a request to Officer Burch for approval of the
ans\ver given by the Court (Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 454,
line 29).
The Court propounded at least fifty-two questions to
Officer Burch ( Tr. 44 7, through 460) , many of which
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were leading questions (Tr. 44 7, line 28; Tr. 448, line 6,
10, 15, 24, 28; Tr. 449, line 24, 28; Tr. 450, line 13, 26;
Tr. 451, line 7, 11; Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 452, line 9, 21,
24; Tr. 454, line 8; Tr. 454, line 29; Tr. 456, line 14,
19; Tr. 45 7, line 13, 29; Tr. 459, line 25) or included
as part of the question or otherwise an observation of
fact (Tr. 449, line 11; Tr. 451, line 20; Tr. 452, line 9,
17, 27, 29; Tr. 454, line 29; Tr. 456, line 14).
Counsel for the State took no part in the proceeding
conducted by the Court at the viewing of the premises
(Tr. 460, line 10, 13).
Counsel for the defendant repeated his objection at
the end of the viewing and the Court undertook a cautionary instruction upon resumption of the proceedings in
the courtroom (Tr. 462, line 1).
The defendant testified in his own behalf that just
before the accident his speed might have been between
45 and 65 miles per hour (Tr. 484, line 18, 27); that
just before the accident he started to speak to Mr. Higbee
in the back seat about some records for the record player
,vhich was in the front of the car (Tr. 485, line 11); that
he did not recall whether he had both hands on the
steering wheel or had turned to Mr. Higbee (Tr. 485,
line 20); but that he did not turn his head far enough to
see Mr. Higbee (Tr. 486, line 3) ; and that he then heard
gravel under the car and the accident occurred (Tr. 486,
line 7).
He further testified that at the time he heard the
gravel his speed was between 50 and 65 miles per hour
(Tr. 489, line 2). He testified that when the car was
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used for participation in supervised drag races it was
specially tuned up and equipped (Tr. 489, line 21) but
that it was not in that condition at the time of the accident (Tr. 490, line 1).
Mr. Higbee, one of the occupants of the car, testified
that the automobile was not traveling at the rate Mr.
Pitcher had estimated but that at the most it might have
been up to 55 or 60 miles per hour (Tr. 280, line 22;
Tr. 302, line 26).
~[r.

Allen Brent Hatch, a witness in a passing car,
estimated the speed of Mr. Delaney's car to be 70 at the
highest (Tr. 317, line 2). His companion, Miss Sylvia
Gale, testified that there was nothing unusual about the
operation of the Delaney vehicle (Tr. 321). She doubted
that it was traveling 70 miles per hour (Tr. 325, line 16)
but did not think her companion necessarily wrong in
his estimate (Tr. 325, line 24).
Mr. Gary Mackelprang, an occupant of a following
vehicle, testified that he had made a statement that the
defendant's automobile might have been going 70 miles
per hour (Tr. 337, line 2), but his then testimony under
cross examination by the State was that the speed could
have been as high as 70 but he doubted it (Tr. 336, line
29.)
Diana Lynn Miller, the fourth occupant of the defendant's car testified that the defendant did not appear
intoxicated (Tr. 368, line 19) ; that there was nothing
unusual about his behavior (Tr. 386, line 17) ; that the
operation of the vehicle seemed normal on the trip up
the canyon (Tr. 375) and that there was no warning
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or indication that the accident was going to happen (Tr.
378, line 21).
There was evidence that the posted speed limit on the
road was 50 miles per hour (Tr. 68, line 28).
The jury found the defendant guilty. The Court
denied defense motions for judgment at the close of the
State's case, for judgment notwithstanding the verdict,
and for a new trial.
The foregoing statement of facts mentions in brief
form the substantive and procedural matters which the
defendant deems pertinent to the disposition of this
appeal. In so doing, however, it necessarily omits considerable evidentiary detail which can only be covered
by recourse to the entire record.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE COURT'S PARTISAN PARTICIPATION IN THE ROLE OF PROSECUTING
ATTORNEY AT THE VIEW, THE COURT'S
AND OFFICER BURCH'S CONDUCT AT THE
VIEW, THE COURT'S COMMENTS ON THE
EVIDENCE AND THE POSSIBLE IMPRESSION
THAT THE COURT WAS HOSTILE TO THE
DEFENDANT DEPRIVED THE DEFENDANT
OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A
FAIR TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
The State's case depended upon proof of such speed
as might constitute driving in reckless disregard of the
safety of others. The State's case consisted of t\VO stages.
In the first, Officer Burch provided the factual founda-
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tion needed for an expert witness's opinion as to speed. In
the second, Mr. Ed M. Pitcher provided the opinion as
to speed.
Officer Burch testified as to all of the important
clements of the foundation needed for the expert witness,
including the skid test conducted by him, measurements
and calculations by him, the grade of the road and the
bank of the curve. The expert witness conducted no tests
and made no measurements.
On cross examination Officer Burch conceded that
at the preliminary hearing he had not remembered certain essential facts concerning the alleged measurements
and even that he had then stated that he did not know
if they had been measured (Tr. 101, line 23, 27). The
Court expressed its opinion that Officer Burch was not
fabricating but that this was up to the jury (Tr. 140,
line 24).
Relying upon the factual foundation derived from
Officer Burch's testimony, including the questionable
measurements and calculations, the State's expert witness, Mr. Pitcher, estimated the speed of the automobile
to be 99.9 to 101 miles per hour at the time of the making
of the scuff marks.
Mr. Pitcher said that alteration of the facts assumed
in the hypothetical question would alter the result. This
included the skid test, road conditions, and particularly
the cord mark measurements. From the chord mark
measurements the radius of the arc of the scuff mark
can be determined and this figure is used in calculating
speed.
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All of the elements used for the hypothetical question,
and particularly the chord mark measurements and the
calculations derived therefrom, were contested by the
defendant. Their proof was an essential part of the
State's case. The jury view of the premises was part of
the State's attempt to prove its case.
The Court granted the State's request that the jury
view the scene, indicating in so doing that it intended
to have either Officer Burch or Trooper Mason point out
marks and things at the scene. Despite the defendant's
objection to this procedure, it was followed by the Court.
Instead of appointing showers as required by Utah Code
Anno. 1953, 77-31-31, the Court and Officer Burch
served that function. The Court commenced with a general description of the scene referring to what he called
still visible paint or crayon marks and to nails driven
into the road. The Court conducted a lengthy interrogation-discussion with Officer Burch reviewing the testimony he had given in court concerning the physical evidence, markings, measurements and other details of the
scene. The following Court-Burch discussion is typical
(Tr. 447):
The Court : This is the point where the scuff mark
or skid mark that you testified to in your testimony
commenced, is that correct?
Burch: Yes.
The Court: Now, will you point out where it went
from this point?
Burch: This is the point that it crossed the center
line. (Indicating)
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The Court: We are now at a point, as I recall, 60
feet from the initial point where you had marked
with the red crayon, is that correct?
Burch : Yes, sir. That is correct.
The Court: And this is the point where the scuff
mark or skid mark that crossed the original
painted center line of the highway, and this is
approximately 60 feet in an easterly direction, is
that correct?
Burch: That's right.
The Court: And you have designated this by a nail
driven into the yellow line?
Burch: That's right.
The Court: And it is visible at this point?
Burch: Yes.
The Court undertook to answer questions posed by
jurors, requesting Officer Burch's approval of his
ans\vers. For example (Tr. 451, line 19):
Juror Irene Bryant: Is this the area that supposedly
the car had hit the bank?
The Court: I'm under the impression, and if you
gentlemen \vho investigated this could correct me,
but \vhere the gravel first came out on the road that is large quantities of it~ was where the car
hit the bank and it knocked the gravel out onto
the road; and that was down where we were just
talking about. Is that correct, Officer Burch?
Burch: Yes.
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Another example (Tr. 454, line 14) :
Juror Meeks Dalton: I'd like to ask the distance from
here to where the car left the road on the opposite
side from where it started.
The Court: You mean left the road on the north side?
Juror Dalton: Yes.
The Court: Well Juror Dalton: Where it tipped on its top.
The Court: Well, you are asking before it tipped on
its top. Now Officer Burch, do,vn where it tipped
on its top -this is something I don't recall there
was testimony given about.
Burch: I don't know exactly on it top, no.
The Court: Apparently it slid for some distance on
its top, Mr. Dalton, and where it tipped and went
on its top, you wouldn't know, would you?
Burch: Not exactly, no.
Utah Constitution, ..L\rticle
.
I, § 12, states:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right . . . to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury....
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-31, provides:
[QJuestions of law are to be decided by the court,
and questions of fact by the jury; . . .
The law is clear on several basic propositions dealing
with the right of an accused to an impartial jury trial of
the facts of his alleged offense.
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The jury shall be the sole trier of facts. People v.
Biddlecome, 3 Utah 208, 2 Pac. 194 ( 1882); State v.
Ba)'es, 47 Utah 474, 155 Pac. 335 ( 1916); State v. Green,
89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750, 755 (1936) (dicta); State v.
Green, 78 Utah 580 6 P.2d 177 ( 1931) ; State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258 ( 1945).
It is equally well established that the judge shall not
comment on the evidence. State v. Green, 78 Utah 580,
6 P.2d 177 ( 1931); State v. Gleason, 86 Utah 26, 40
P.2d 222 ( 1935) (dicta); State v. Greene, 33 Utah 497,
94 Pac. 987 ( 1908); State v. ]ames, 32 Utah 152, 89 Pac.
460 ( 1907).
The credibility of witnesses is a question solely for
the jury. State v. Diaz, 76 Utah 463, 290 Pac. 727
( 1930); State v. Green, 89 Utah 437, 57 P.2d 750
( 1936) (dicta).
Although not always error, allowing the jurors to ask
questions is properly frowned upon. State v ..Martinez,
7lTtah 2d 387.326 P.2d 102 (1958); State v. Anderson,
108Utah 130, 158P.2d 127 (1945).
The intimate, partisan, detailed participation by the
Court at the scene as though he were the prosecuting
attorney rather than the judge could only result in the
jury's minds in such an association of the judge with the
State's case and its key witness, upon whose credibility
and accuracy the entirety of the State's case depended,
as would invariably give the impression that the Court
favored the witness and believed his testimony. This we
believe to be substantial, fundamental error, for while it
may be proper for the Court to ask questions in appro-
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priate cases, it is manifestly improper for the Court to
usurp the functions of counsel. State v. Green, 89 Utah
437, 57 P.2d 750 (1936) (dicta); People v. Rigney, 10
Cal. Rptr. 625, 359 P.2d 23 ( 1961) (dicta); People v.
Robinson, 4 Cal. Rptr. 50 ( 1960); Hunter v. United
States, 62 F.2d 217, 220 (5th Cir. 1932).
Extended interrogation cannot fail but to give an
impression of belief or disbelief, depending on the circumstances. As this court explained in State v. Green, at page
755:
It is generally held that in the exercise of his
right to question a witness, the judge should not
indulge in an extensive examination or usurp the
function of counsel. In a criminal case he should
not by form of question or manner or extent of
examination indicate to the jury his opinion as to
the guilt of the defendant or the weight or sufficiency of the evidence. Note, 84 A.L.R. 1172;
... His examination should not be extensive because it is a matter of much difficulty for any
person to indulge in an extensive examination of
the witness without indicating a train of thought
or some feeling with respect to the truth or falsity
of the testimony being elicited. . . .
Counsel for the State did not need the Court's able
assistance for their conduct of their case was thorough,
professional and competent. State v. Crotts, 22 Wash.
245, 60 Pac. 403 ( 1900) held it error for the Court to
take over the examination of a witness and to ask leading
questions when the counsel for the State was doing a
capable job, for the reason that:
[I]t is a fact vvell and universally known by
courts and practitioners that the ordinary juror is

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

15

always anxious to obtain the opinion of the court
on matters \vhich are submitted to his discretion,
and that such opinion, if know to the juror, has a
great influence upon the final determination of the
issues. This information can be conveyed as readily
to the jury by leading questions asked of them, and
the manner of the judge in asking such questions,
as by a direct comment upon the testimony in the
charge to the jury.
The recent case of People v. Robinson, 4 Cal. Rptr.
50, ( 1960) held that it was error for the Court to take
over the duties of the district attorney in the questioning
of witnesses for in so doing he gives the jury the impression that he as allying himself v.rith the prosecution with
inevitable harm to the defendant being the result.
Other instances at the trial add to the cumulative
effect of the Court's partisan participation. For example,
the Court's comment that he did not think Officer Burch
\\'as fabricating his testimony with reference to the contested chord mark and middle ordinate measurements
would serve to indicate credibility of the witness in the
opinion of the Court (Tr. 140, line 24). At another point
the Court expressed belief in the testimony of the witness
concerning the air pressure in the tires of the automobile
(Tr. 131, line 27).
And" immediately after the State commenced its
cross examination of the defendant by asking the following question and getting the following answer :
Question: With respect to your automobile, Mr.
Delaney, isn't it a fact that it had a standard fourspeed transmission in it?
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Answer: Yes, it did. But you could order one from
the factory.
the court interjected:
Mr. Delaney, he didn't ask you if you could
order one. He asked you what your car had. It is
true that people can buy anything. Just answer the
questions that are asked you. Go ahead, Mr. Gardner. (Tr. 491, lines 5-13)
Each of these numerous errors deprived the defendant
of his right to a fair jury trial. Whether considered individually or cumulatively, the Court's partisan participation in the role of prosecuting attorney, the manner
of conducting the view with the Court and the key witness
for the State as joint showers and testifiers, the comments
on the evidence during the view and the trial, and the
possible impression that the Court was hostile to the
defendant deprived the defendant of his right to a fair
jury trial and constituted prejudicial error of a most
fundamental nature.
POINT II. IT WAS PREJUDICIAL ERROR FOR
THE COURT AND THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS TO CONDUCT THE VIEW OF THE
PRE1fiSES CONTRARY TO THE MANNER
PROVIDED BY THE CLEAR AND EXPLICIT
PROVISIONS OF UTAH CODE ANNO. 1953,
77-31-26.
Utah Code Anno. 1953, 77-31-26, provides that when
the court deems a view proper
... [I] t may order the jury to be conducted in a
body, in the custody of an officer, to the place,
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which must be shown to them by a person appointed by the court for that purpose; and the
officer must be sworn to suffer no person to speak
or communicate \vith the jury, nor do so himself,
on any subject connected with the trial ...
This statute does not authorize the Court to accompany the jury to the scene; it does not authorize the
taking of evidence, let alone a substantial amount of it,
at the scene; it does not authorize the Court and the
prosecution's key witness to act as showers at the scene.
In State v. Mortensen, 26, Utah 312, 73 Pac. 562, at
573 ( 1903) this court quoted with approval language
from another opinion to the effect that a similar statute
did not intend the judge to accompany the jury and that
the statute commands that no one but the appointed
officer speak to the jury and they are forbidden to speak
about the subject of the trial.
Substantial authority says that it is improper to take
rvidence at the viewing of the premises. E.g., State v.
~\lcVeigh, 35 Wash. 2d 493, 214 P.2d 165 ( 1950);
Scruggs v. State, 34 Okla. Cr. 97, 244 Pac. 838 ( 1926).
The statute plainly provides that the jury are to
be conducted to the view by an officer sworn to suffer
no person to speak to or communicate with the jury, nor
to do so himself, on any subject connected with the trial.
Instead of complying with this clear requirement, the
Court conducted what amounted to an extensive review
session of that evidence which was most damaging to the
defendant. This review session was a joint venture between the Court and the State's key witness, Officer
Burch. The statute authorizes the use of an impartial
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person as a shower, it does not authorize, nor can we
sanction, the type of partisan evidence taking~ comments,
and general review of the State's key witness' testimony
by himself and the Court at the vie\ving.
Even in civil cases it has been held in error for a
witness truck driver to participate in a viewing to the
extent of merely pointing out where he commenced
passing another vehicle. Martin v. TiptonJ 261 S.W. 2d
809 (Ky. 1953).
Even more so in a criminal case should the defendant
have the right to have the proper procedures followed.
The manner of the viewing in the instant was not only
contrary to the plain wording of the statute, but apart
from that constituted prejudicial error because of the
partisan participation by the Court and the taking of
evidence in such a mannner as to imply that the Court
believed the testimony of Officer Burch. On either ground
it constitutes reversible error. It deprived the defendant
of a statutory safeguard for a fair trial and it deprived
him of a fair trial.
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT
STRIKING OFFICER BURCH'S TESTIMONY
CONCERNING THE CHORD MARK MEASUREMENTS FOR THE REASON THAT SUCH
TESTIMONY WAS NOT WITHIN THE SCOPE
OF THE RECOLLECTION REFRESHED RULE
AND WAS NOT INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION OF MATTERS WITHIN THE PERSONAL
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WITNESS.
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'fhc accident occurred on March 2. The measurements, if any, \verc taken within a few hours. The preliminary hearing 'vas held on April 12 ( Tr. 141, line 29) .
At the preliminary hearing, Officer Burch had neither
notes nor recollection as to 'vhere the important chord
mark measurements were made. He testified "I don't
know that we even measured it." (Tr. 139, line 5)
On examination by the State, Officer Burch said he
nc\'rr did find the purported notes ( Tr. 140, line 1-7) .
In response to the question of how he did determine the
placement of the measurements, he answered "Sergeant
Reid and Trooper Mason and I determined together that
that was 'vhere we measured," (Tr. 128, line 6) and
"We remembered where we measured it." (Tr. 139, line
20).
The Court refused to strike the evidence, g1v1ng as
the reason that it was admissible as recollection refreshed.
The doctrine of recollection refreshed is not applicable
to the instant situation. It is properly used when a witness
on the stand cannot remember details of a matter, which
details had been reduced to \vriting, and the writing is
used for refreshing an independent recollection. Its purpose is to allow the witness to testify from an independent
memory that the facts are true. Com. v. Jeffs, 132 Mass.
j ( 1882).
In the instant case it seems quite clear that Officer
Burch ,,·as not testifying from an independent memory
of the facts but from a reconstructed "group recollection"
resulting from the discussion among t\vo others, who did
not testify as to the pertinent facts, and himself. This
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kind of a reconstructed group recollection is an inadmissible mixture of conjecture and hearsay, two-thirds of
which is not subject to cross examination and which does
not meet any criterion for admission.
In addition to error in admitting the evidence at all,
the Court indicated that it did not think Officer Burch
was fabricating, thus adding the weight of the Court to
highly questionable evidence, evidence which went to the
heart of the State's case.
The witness did not even remember when the purported discussion took place. He could not even place
the month (Tr. 142, line 1-14).
We respectfully submit that under the circumstances
it is clear that the witness did not testify from an independent recollection of the facts but from a reconstructed group recollection which was not independent
knowledge of the facts at all but conjecture and hearsay.
It was error to fail to strike this evidence at the defendant's request for allowing it to remain materially prejudiced his right to a fair trial.

POINT IV. THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
UPON WHICH THE JURY COULD HAVE
FOUND THE DEFENDANT GUILTY.
Unfortunately accidents can and do happen. We do
not condone negligent or careless driving, nor do we
oppose attempts to improve highway safety. On the other
hand, however, an indictable misdemeanor conviction is
a serious matter and one which requires not negligence,
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nor gross negligence, but conduct more extreme than
either of these two degrees of negligence. State v. Berchtold, 11 Utah 2d 208, 357 P.2d 183 ( 1960).
The only possible evidence of such wanton conduct
as could have justified a jury verdict is that evidence of
speed developed by the testimony of Officer Burch and
Mr. Pitcher.
We respectfully submit that the credible evidence
legally before the jury did not and could not support a
\'Crdict of guilty. We submit that the verdict was based
upon the aura of credibility which the Court's partisan
participation gave Officer Burch's testimony, upon evidence improperly received at the viewing of the premises
and the other errors enumerated in the prior points of
this brief. In addition, the viewing itself must have improperly s\vayed the jurors although the view is not
properly evidence for them to consider but merely an
aid to understanding the evidence. State v. Mortensen,
26 Utah 312. 73 Pac. 562 ( 1903).

If we strip a\vay the effect of the Court's participation
errors. the effect of the view errors, and the improperly
admitted testimony of Officer Burch relating to the
measurements, there is, we respectfully submit, no credible
evidence as to such speed as to constitute reckless disregard of the safety of other.
Even if the testimony of Officer Burch is not stricken
.
'
but is vie,,·ed as it should be if retained, the conclusion
must be the same for in the posture in which it arises,
his testimony is not sufficiently credible to support a
conviction for it is patently contradictory to his sworn
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testimony in a prior related proceeding and is only group
recollection reconstructed and not independent evidence
of the facts involved.
We respectfully submit that it was error for the Court
to refuse to grant the defendant's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict.
CONCLUSION
The defendant respectfully submits that there is insufficient eivdence to support the verdict of guilty and
that the several procedural errors discussed herein
deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a
fair trial of the facts by an impartial jury.
The defendant prays this court to reverse the trial
court and to remand the case with instructions to enter
a judgement of acquittal notwithstanding the verdict,
or in the alternative to remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

J.

HARLAN BURNS
95 North Main
Cedar City, Utah

Attorney for the
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